With the close of the October Term 2025 (OT’25), the Supreme Court has started to assemble its growing list of cases it will hear in the next term (OT’26), including the ones summarized below. These certiorari grants signal the Court’s continuing interest in administrative law, civil procedure, and constitutional questions involving religious liberties.
Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guåhan (25-579)
Department of the Air Force v. Prutehi Guåhan (No. 25-579) is a Ninth Circuit case presenting the question of whether the Air Force must conduct environmental impact review under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) before submitting a permit renewal application under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 to continue disposing of hazardous waste in Guam, and whether that permit renewal application constitutes “final agency action” reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
This case presents the Court with another opportunity to address the intersection of environmental obligations and administrative law. In particular, the Court’s decision may provide important guidance regarding the scope of NEPA’s procedural requirements and the availability of judicial review under the APA in the wake of recent administrative law jurisprudence, especially when Congress has established overlapping statutory regimes.
Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, Georgia (No. 25-352)
In Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, Georgia (No. 25-352), the Court will consider a narrow civil procedure question that is expected to clarify whether a defendant forfeits an affirmative defense by failing to plead it in answer to the complaint before raising it at summary judgment.
This case arises from a Title VII pregnancy discrimination action brought by Dr. Jasmine Younge after she was terminated from a senior position in the Fulton County District Attorney’s Office. Although the D.A.’s Office failed to assert Title VII’s “personal staff” exemption as an affirmative defense in its answer, it later raised that defense in support of summary judgment after the deadline to amend the pleadings had expired under the district court’s scheduling order. The district court, nevertheless, granted summary judgment on that basis.
Although procedurally narrow, the case could have significant implications for federal civil litigation. The Court’s decision is expected to clarify the relationship between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)’s pleading requirements, Rule 16 scheduling orders, and Rule 56’s summary judgment practice.
St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy (No. 25-581)
St. Mary Catholic Parish v. involves the exclusion of a Catholic preschool from state funding. The case presents a First Amendment challenge to Colorado’s requirement that participating preschools agree not to deny enrollment to LGBTQ children and children with LGBTQ parents as a condition of receiving state funding. The preschool argues that Colorado violated the Free Exercise Clause in declining to exempt the preschool from that requirement.
The Court is in a position to answer two questions following its oft-criticized decision in Employment Division v. Smith,494 U.S. 872 (1990): (1) Whether a plaintiff establishes that a law lacks general applicability only by demonstrating unfettered administrative discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct?; and (2) Whether Smith’s rule—that the government does not violate the Free Exercise Clause by enforcing neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious practices—applies when the government expressly excludes religious institutions from participation in a public benefits program?
Although the Court expressly declined to consider whether Smith itself should be overturned, the case, nevertheless, represents another significant chapter in the Court’s continuing refinement of its Free Exercise jurisprudence. Even if Smith survives this case, the Court’s resolution of these questions could further narrow its precedential reach by expanding the circumstances under which religious claimants may demonstrate that the law is not generally applicable.
Crowther v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (No. 25-183)
Crowther v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (No. 25-183) presents the question of whether Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides employees of federally funded educational institutions with an implied private right of action to sue for sex discrimination in employment. The Court granted review to resolve a circuit split over the relationship between Title IX and Title VII (of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) in the education-employment context.
The case arises from consolidated actions brought by former employees of Georgia public universities alleging employment discrimination and retaliation under Title IX. The Eleventh Circuit held that Title IX does not provide employees with an implied private cause of action, reasoning that the Supreme Court’s recognition of an implied Title IX remedy has been limited to the statute’s intended beneficiaries—students—and that Congress established Title VII as the comprehensive statutory framework governing employment discrimination claims. But other courts of appeals have permitted such employees to pursue employment discrimination claims under Title IX, creating the conflict the Supreme Court is now expected to resolve.
The Court’s decision is likely to have significant consequences for colleges, universities, and other educational recipients of federal funding. If the Court recognizes an implied private right of action under Title IX for employees, such plaintiffs may be able to pursue employment discrimination claims without satisfying Title VII’s administrative exhaustion requirements and other procedural limitations. If the Court affirms the Eleventh Circuit, employment claims generally will remain subject to Title VII’s exclusive remedial framework.
More broadly, the case presents an important question concerning the Supreme Court’s modern approach to implied causes of action. The Court will be asked to determine whether Title IX’s judicially recognized implied private remedy extends into an area where Congress has already enacted a detailed statutory scheme governing the same subject matter. Accordingly, the Court’s decision may have implications beyond Title IX by further clarifying how it approaches implied private rights of action when overlapping federal statutes govern the same conduct.
RiseandShine Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc. (No. 24-1016)
An important issue in trademark law comes to the fore in RiseandShine Corp. v. PepsiCo, Inc. In the next Term, the Supreme Court will decide whether trademark strength is a question of fact in the likelihood-of-confusion analysis under 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
Canned-coffee drink manufacturer RiseandShine Corp. took on drink-making titan PepsiCo, Inc. in a 2024 lawsuit alleging trademark infringement caused by the MTN Dew Rise Energy mark. Citing similarities between the MTN Dew Rise Energy mark and RiseandShine’s own Rise coffee brand, RiseandShine alleged consumers would mistakenly believe Rise coffee products were associated with PepsiCo. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s analysis of the strength of RiseandShine’s trademark as a question of law at the summary-judgment phase.
The grant of certiorari in this case signals increased attention on statutory interpretation in a court where textualism often resolves many legal issues. Moreover, the eventual opinion will shed light on the requisite factual basis necessary to survive summary judgment in trademark cases.
Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. (No. 25-159)
Next, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., a case that will shape the financing of energy-infrastructure projects for years to come. The case began in Watford City, North Dakota, when area ranchers demanded that a pipeline seeking to take their land through eminent domain pay a fair price to do so.
The Natural Gas Act permits energy companies to condemn land to build natural gas infrastructure, and landowners are owed “just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment when such condemnations occur. But how much compensation is “just” in the context of 15 U.S.C. § 717f? Following a circuit split in which different courts have answered this question by referencing state law, which generally provides greater compensation than the constitutional minimum, the Supreme Court will decide whether that practice is required, permitted, or forbidden.
In keeping with the Court’s emphasis on statutory interpretation, a ruling in this case will likely involve heavy textual and constitutional analysis. A decision in this case will have an immediate impact on both the financing and marketing of natural-gas projects around the country.
International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson (No. 25-840)
Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson. The case arose in Washington State when institutional plaintiffs and the parents of five minors challenged state laws that permitted minors over the age of 13 to receive outpatient treatment without parental consent.
Chiefly, the plaintiffs alleged their parental rights would be damaged if their children, who had exhibited signs of gender dysphoria, were to run away and receive gender-affirming care that the parents did not endorse. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing, reasoning that the parents had not suffered a concrete injury and that there had been no actions that brought them within the ambit of the laws they challenged. As for the organizational plaintiffs, the court came to the same conclusion and found no cognizable injury.
Constitutional parental rights have not appeared on the Supreme Court’s docket in recent years. Ferguson promises to explore the nature of that right and the type of injury necessary to define a redressable claim.
For more information, please contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, or Sadie Betting.