On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court held in Trump v. Cook (No. 25A312) that Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook may remain in office pending litigation challenging her removal proceedings. By a 5–4 vote, the Court declined to stay a preliminary injunction preserving Cook’s position, concluding that the government had not demonstrated that extraordinary relief was warranted before the merits of the dispute could be fully litigated. Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion. 

On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court held 6–3 in Chatrie v. United States (No. 25-112) that law enforcement’s acquisition of Google Location History through a geofence warrant constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search.” Importantly, however, the Court did not hold that geofence warrants are categorically unconstitutional. Instead, after concluding that the Government conducted a Fourth Amendment search, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the particular warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirements.

As signaled in Dykema’s March 2026 edition, Montgomery v. Caribe Transport, II (No. 24-1238) arises from a highway accident in which Petitioner Montgomery was struck by a vehicle operated by an employee of Respondent Caribe Transport II, LLC, which had been selected by C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., a freight broker that arranged the shipment. The case asked the Supreme Court to determine whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempts common law negligent selection claims against freight brokers.

On May 14, 2026, the Supreme Court held in Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties (No. 25-83) that a federal court that stays a case pending arbitration under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) retains jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting arbitration award, even if the post-arbitration motions would not independently satisfy federal subject matter jurisdiction. Justice Sotomayor authored the Court’s unanimous opinion. The decision clarifies that a stay under § 3 suspends—rather than terminates—the federal action, allowing the district court to supervise the arbitration through its conclusion.

On June 23, 2026, the Supreme Court held in Pung v. Isabella County (No. 25-95) that when the government sells a property in a tax auction to collect unpaid taxes, the Fifth Amendment generally measures “just compensation” by the amount realized at the tax sale auction, not the property’s fair market value—so long as the auction was fairly conducted in light of the nation’s historical tax sale practices. The decision rejects a significant expansion of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause that could have required governments to compensate former property owners based on appraised market value rather than the auction sales price. At the same time, the Court emphasized that the Constitution still requires a fair auction process and left open what that requirement may entail. The Court, therefore, rejected Petitioner’s argument that he was constitutionally entitled to recover the difference between the auction price and the home’s alleged market value. Because the lower courts may not have fully considered whether the auction procedures used in this case were fair, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

On May 28, 2026, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock (No. 24–935) that a worker may qualify for the transportation worker exemption in § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) even if the worker never personally crosses state lines or transports goods across state borders. In the opinion written by Justice Gorsuch, the Court concluded that the relevant inquiry is not whether the worker’s own route is interstate, but whether the worker plays a direct and necessary role in the interstate movement of goods.

In a unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court in Villarreal v. Texas (No. 24-557) affirmed the Texas Court of  Criminal Appeals’ holding that an order prohibiting a criminal defendant and his attorney from discussing the defendant’s testimony during a mid-testimony, overnight recess does not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.