In Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., the Supreme Court will determine whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows a district court to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding,” can be invoked when a party voluntarily dismisses its case.

Gary Waetzig sued his employer, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., claiming wrongful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Because his claims were subject to arbitration, Waetzig voluntarily dismissed his federal lawsuit and initiated arbitration proceedings. Halliburton moved for summary judgment, which the arbitrator granted. Waetzig subsequently moved to reopen the federal case under Rule 60(b) and sought to vacate the arbitrator’s ruling. The district court granted his motion, reopening the case, vacating the arbitration award, and ordering new proceedings before a different arbitrator.

Halliburton appealed the decision, arguing that Rule 60(b) does not apply to voluntary dismissals. A divided panel of the Tenth Circuit agreed, reversing the district court’s decision and reasoning that Rule 60(b) does not authorize reopening a voluntarily dismissed case because it is not a final judgment, order, or proceeding. Waetzig then petitioned the Supreme Court for review.

Before the Supreme Court, Waetzig argues that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is “final” for purposes of Rule 60(b). He also argues that federal courts have historically had the power to reopen dismissed cases, codified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Waetzig further argues that the Tenth Circuit’s ruling improperly strips district courts of their power to correct mistakes and fraud.

In response, Halliburton maintains that voluntary dismissals are not a final judgment, order, or proceeding under established case law and cannot be retroactively treated as final. Additionally, Halliburton argues that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the motion to reopen the case in the first place because invoking jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act, which Waetzig did, requires an independent basis for jurisdiction, which he did not include in his motion.

The Justices heard oral argument on January 14, 2025, focusing on the potential downsides of allowing district courts to second guess arbitration awards. Chief Justice Roberts questioned whether such an application of Rule 60(b) was enabling a district court to collaterally attack the arbitration award even though it may not be the appropriate forum for challenging an arbitration award. Justice Sotomayor questioned what statute gave a district court the subject matter jurisdiction to vacate an arbitration award. Justice Gorsuch questioned Waetzig’s definition of “proceeding,” trying to determine what would not be considered a proceeding under such a broad definition. Justice Jackson similarly questioned Waetzig’s interpretation of other parts of Rule 60(b), seeking to determine just how broad such an application would be. Justices Gorsuch and Jackson also attempted to determine the limitations of Halliburton’s reading of Rule 60(b) to see if its narrower reading could potentially deny litigants an opportunity to bring their cases in certain situations, like fraud or malpractice.

A decision is expected later in the term.  Stay tuned for Dykema’s forthcoming alert discussing the Court’s opinion.

For more information, please contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, Mark Magyar, or Christopher Sakauye.