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On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court held in Trump v. Slaughter (No. 25-332) that statutory restrictions limiting the President’s authority to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) violate Article II of the Constitution. By a 6–3 vote, the Court overruled its nearly ninety-year-old decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, concluding that Congress may not insulate FTC Commissioners from presidential removal through a “for-cause” removal provision. Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, joined by Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett in full and by Justice Thomas except as to Part III. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissent, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. The decision marks one of the Court’s most significant separation of powers rulings in decades, substantially expanding presidential control over independent executive agencies while narrowing the constitutional foundation for statutory removal protections.

As summarized in Dykema’s January 2026 edition, the dispute arose after President Trump removed FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter before the expiration of her statutory term. Slaughter argued that the Federal Trade Commission Act permits federal removal only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” and that her removal, therefore, violated federal law. After the district court ordered relief restoring her position, the Supreme Court granted review before judgment to determine both the constitutionality of the FTC’s removal protections and the continued vitality of Humphrey’s Executor.

The majority grounded its analysis in  Article II’s Vesting Clause, which vests the executive power in a single President. From that constitutional premise, the Court reasoned that the President must possess authority over—and, when necessary, remove—officers who exercise executive power on the President’s behalf.

The Court concluded that Humphrey’s Executor cannot be reconciled with that constitutional structure. Although acknowledging that the decision had stood for nearly ninety years, the majority characterized its distinction between “executive,” “quasi-legislative,” and “quasi-judicial” functions as both unstable and inconsistent with the Constitution’s allocation of executive authority. In the Court’s view, the FTC exercises substantial executive power through investigations, enforcement actions, administrative litigation, and regulatory oversight. Because those responsibilities involve execution of federal law, Congress may not shield FTC Commissioners from presidential removal.

The Court likewise rejected arguments grounded in stare decisis (a Latin legal term that means “to stand by things decided”) and reliance interests. The majority explained that reliance interests cannot preserve a precedent that fundamentally misallocates constitutional authority among the branches of government. In the separation of powers context, the Court reasoned, adherence to the Constitution’s structural design outweighs concerns regarding administrative continuity or institutional convenience.

Equally important is what the Court did not decide. The majority expressly declined to determine whether every federal officer exercising executive authority must be removable at will or whether similar removal protections governing other governmental entities are constitutional. Instead, the Court limited its holding to the FTC and observed that institutions with distinct constitutional or historical characteristics, including the Tax Court and the Court of Federal Claims, may present different questions.

Justice Gorsuch concurred, agreeing that Article II’s text and structure require presidential control over executive officers and emphasizing that the Court properly abandoned what he described as “adventurous theories” underlying Humphrey’s Executor.

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented. The dissent argued that the majority unnecessarily discarded nearly a century of settled precedent and disrupted the longstanding framework Congress has used to establish independent regulatory agencies. In their view, Humphrey’s Executor properly recognized that Congress may provide limited removal protections to promote agency expertise, continuity, and independence without impermissibly interfering with presidential authority. The dissent warned that the majority’s decision concentrates more power in the President and calls into question the future independence of numerous federal agencies.

Takeaways

  • The President may remove FTC Commissioners without satisfying the FTC Act’s traditional “for-cause” standard. The Court held that Article II does not permit Congress to insulate FTC Commissioners from presidential removal.
  • The opinion leaves important questions unresolved. The Court did not hold that every removal restriction governing every federal officer is unconstitutional. Future litigation will likely address how the Court’s reasoning applies to other agencies and officials exercising different governmental functions.

For more information, please contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, or David Ter-Petrosyan.

For more information, please contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, or David Ter-Petrosyan.

A special thanks to Summer Associate Nareh Aghakhanian for assisting with this alert.