Earlier this month, in BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, the Supreme Court considered whether a court must balance the finality principles of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) with the liberal amendment policies of Rule 15(a) when plaintiffs seek to reopen a final judgment to file an amended complaint.

The victims and surviving family members (collectively, Survivors) of attacks carried out by Hamas sued BLOM Bank SAL, alleging that the bank aided and abetted Hamas by providing financial services to entities linked to the terrorist organization in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), id. § 2333(d)(2). After they rejected opportunities to amend their pleading, the district court dismissed their complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard for aiding-and-abetting liability under JASTA but affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the complaint still failed to state a claim under the correct standard. The Survivors returned to the district court and moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) and 15(a)(2) to vacate the judgment and file an amended complaint. The district court denied the motion. However, on a second appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case, instructing the court to weigh Rule 60(b)’s finality interests against the liberal policies of Rule 15(a). The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve whether this balancing approach is proper.

The central question before the Court is whether Rule 60(b)(6)’s stringent “extraordinary circumstances” standard applies when a party seeks to amend a complaint after a final judgment has been entered. Rule 60(b) sets forth specific grounds for relief from a final judgment in subsections (1) through (5), while subsection (6) allows for relief for “any other reason” that justifies reopening a case—a high bar requiring a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Rule 15(a), by contrast, reflects a more permissive standard, allowing courts to freely grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” The bank argues that the Second Circuit’s approach undermines Rule 60(b)’s emphasis on finality by improperly incorporating the more lenient Rule 15(a) standard.

During the March 3 oral argument, the Justices posed a range of questions reflecting their concerns about the balance between procedural flexibility and the finality of judgments. Chief Justice Roberts focused on the procedural history of the case, asking whether the Survivors had declined previous opportunities to amend their complaint before the final judgment and how that decision influenced their subsequent Rule 60(b) motion. Justice Thomas questioned the applicability of Rule 15(a) in the post-judgment context, asking whether allowing amendment after a final judgment would undermine the finality that Rule 60(b) is designed to protect. Justice Alito expressed concern about the potential for abuse if Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard were applied post-judgment, raising the issue of whether such an approach could lead to endless litigation and what safeguards could be put in place to prevent that outcome.

Justice Sotomayor explored the equitable considerations involved, questioning how courts should balance the interests of plaintiffs seeking justice with the defendants’ right to finality and repose. Justice Kavanaugh focused on the standard of review, inquiring whether an appellate court should defer to the district court or if de novo review would be more appropriate. Justice Barrett examined the interaction between the rules, asking whether the “extraordinary circumstances” requirement of Rule 60(b) could be satisfied based solely on Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy or if additional factors were necessary.

The Survivors’ argument that extraordinary circumstances existed because they had no meaningful opportunity to amend before the Second Circuit overturned the district court’s erroneous legal standard was challenged by Justice Kagan, who observed that the Second Circuit appeared to adopt a hybrid standard—what she described as a “kind of mishmash” of Rule 60(b) and 15(a). Justice Gorsuch followed up, pointedly asking whether the Court could simply state that “Rule 60(b) governs” without reference to Rule 15(a). The Survivors’ counsel conceded that such a ruling would be appropriate.

During the bank’s argument, Justices Gorsuch and Kagan explored whether courts may consider the liberal policies underlying Rule 15(a) within a Rule 60(b) analysis, even if not required to do so. Justice Jackson raised concerns about the broader implications of the bank’s argument, suggesting that it could undermine a party’s right to appeal by foreclosing the opportunity to amend after a dismissal based on its pleadings.

Collectively, the Justices’ questions appeared to reflect broad concerns about preserving the integrity of final judgments while ensuring that litigants have a fair opportunity to amend their pleadings when justice requires. Thus, the Court’s decision in this case could clarify the relationship between the finality of judgments under Rule 60(b) and the liberality of amendments under Rule 15(a), resolving whether these two principles should be harmonized or kept distinct in post-judgment contexts. 

Stay tuned for Dykema’s decision alert after the Court issues its opinion, which is expected later this term.

For more information, please contact Chantel Febus,  James Azadian, or Ryan VanOver.