The Supreme Court heard argument in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel (No. 24-783), a case that presents a deceptively narrow procedural question with potentially significant consequences for federal jurisdiction: whether the 30-day deadline for removal set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is subject to equitable tolling. The case arises from high-profile litigation brought by the Michigan Attorney General seeking to decommission Enbridge’s Line 5 pipeline, but the Court’s resolution is likely to reverberate far beyond the energy sector.

Enbridge removed the case to federal court more than two years after being served with the complaint, well outside the statutory 30-day window. The district court nevertheless permitted the removal to stand, invoking equitable tolling to excuse the delay. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the statutory deadline is not subject to equitable modification. The Supreme Court’s review thus squarely presents whether §1446(b) establishes a rigid claims-processing rule or instead operates like a statute of limitations, presumptively subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances.

At oral argument, the Justices engaged most directly with how removal deadlines fit within the Court’s broader equitable-tolling jurisprudence. Enbridge urged the Court to extend the presumption—recognized in cases involving statutes of limitations—that filing deadlines are subject to equitable tolling absent a clear statement to the contrary. But that analogy encountered resistance. Several Justices appeared skeptical that removal statutes, which govern the allocation of authority between state and federal courts, should be treated as ordinary timing provisions. Justice Thomas’s questioning highlighted the absence of any precedent applying equitable tolling in the removal context, underscoring the doctrinal leap Enbridge was asking the Court to take.

Michigan, by contrast, framed the deadline as a firm constraint that serves important structural interests, including respect for state-court proceedings and the prompt resolution of forum disputes. Michigan acknowledged that certain equitable doctrines—particularly estoppel—may apply in cases involving misconduct by an opposing party, but it maintained that equitable tolling, which excuses a litigant’s own delay, is categorically unavailable. That distinction appeared to resonate with several members of the Court, who explored whether importing tolling into this context would undermine the predictability and administrability of removal practice.

The Justices also probed the practical stakes of Enbridge’s position. In particular, the Court showed little enthusiasm for the suggestion that federal courts were better suited to adjudicate the underlying dispute. Justice Kavanaugh’s questioning reflected a concern that Enbridge’s argument, at bottom, rested on a perceived advantage in federal court rather than any statutory entitlement to a delayed removal. The Court’s reaction may suggest a reluctance to expand removal doctrine in a manner that could invite strategic delay or forum shopping.

The case thus sits at the intersection of two competing principles: the Court’s general willingness to apply equitable doctrines to statutory deadlines and its longstanding insistence that removal statutes (which are jurisdictional) be strictly construed. A decision recognizing equitable tolling would introduce flexibility into removal practice but at the cost of increased uncertainty and potential satellite litigation over what constitutes “extraordinary circumstances.” A decision rejecting tolling would reinforce a bright-line rule that prioritizes clarity and finality, even where equitable considerations might favor a different outcome.

For practitioners, the immediate takeaway is straightforward. Unless and until the Court holds otherwise, the 30-day removal deadline remains a critical—and likely unforgiving—constraint. Defendants contemplating removal should act promptly and assume that equitable doctrines will provide, at best, uncertain relief. More broadly, the Court’s ultimate reasoning may signal how it intends to approach similar questions involving the intersection of jurisdictional or procedural rules and equitable authority in other statutory contexts.

A decision is expected later this Term.

For more information, please contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, Andrew VanEgmond, or Sadie Betting.