On January 20, 2026, in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, the Supreme Court unanimously held that litigants do not have unlimited time to challenge judgments as void; instead, they must file any such challenge within a “reasonable time.” The decision resolved an 11-1 circuit split, affirming the Sixth Circuit and concluding that all the other circuit courts to address this question have been improperly allowing litigants to seek to vacate void judgments with no time limit at all.
As summarized in Dykema’s December 2025 edition, after filing for bankruptcy, Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC filed suit against Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. to recover money allegedly owed. Vista-Pro mailed the summons and complaint to Coney Island, but did not follow the service rules. When Coney Island did not respond, the bankruptcy court entered a default judgment, and Vista-Pro’s trustee unsuccessfully attempted to collect the judgment. Years later, Coney Island moved to vacate the default judgment as void due to improper service and lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court and court of appeals treated Coney Island’s motion as untimely.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by seven of his colleagues. The Court held that Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4). This conclusion was largely based on Rule 60’s plain text: a Rule 60(b)(4) motion for relief from an allegedly void judgment constitutes a “motion under Rule 60(b)” and therefore must comply with Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” limit on all Rule 60(b) motions. This conclusion was reinforced by Rule 60(c)(1)’s additional one-year limit on Rule 60(b) motions alleging mistakes, new evidence, or fraud but without providing an analogous limitation for motions claiming voidness.
The Court explained that allowing parties to file motions for relief from a void judgment at anytime would have “extreme implications,” such as allowing parties to appeal a district court’s allegedly improper subject matter jurisdiction finding at any time—regardless of appellate filing deadlines. Although Coney Island did not argue that the “reasonable time” limitation violated due process, the Court noted that it likely did not, in further support of its conclusion that the vast majority of the circuit courts erroneously overrode Rule 60’s plain text. And, sticking to that theme, the Court dismissed Coney Island’s arguments about “historical practice” because “the Rule’s ‘text and structure’ take priority over historical practice.”
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, agreeing with the Court’s conclusion and most of its reasoning. She wrote separately only to note her belief that the Court should not have commented at all on any potential due process challenges to the “reasonable time” limitation because Coney Island did not make that argument.
The Court’s decision reinforces the importance of parties acting quickly once they learn that a judgment is entered against them without their prior knowledge. Although parties in that situation can no longer wait an extended or indefinite amount of time to take action, the “reasonable time” standard still allows parties to argue that a judgment of which they were unaware should be set aside, but only if they act promptly upon learning of the judgment or facts that suggest the existence of the judgment (e.g., collection efforts).
For more information, please contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, Mark Magyar, Andy VanEgmond, or Monika Harris.