On March 2, 2026, in Mirabelli v. Bonta (No. 25A810), the Supreme Court blocked a California law that prohibited public school officials from disclosing a student’s gender identity at school to their parents without the student’s consent, even if the parents expressly asked for the information.

In Mirabelli, teachers and parents challenged the California law on the grounds that it violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parents, such as John and Jane Poe, asserted that school officials did not inform them when their daughter began to identify as a boy and that they were not aware of the transition until the daughter attempted suicide in eighth grade. Other parents expressed concern that the nondisclosure policy prevented them from guiding their children’s religious upbringing. A California federal court granted an injunction in favor of the parents, preventing schools from “misleading” parents about their children’s gender identity and requiring schools to follow parent directions regarding names and pronouns. The Ninth Circuit, however, stayed this injunction, causing the parents and teachers to file an application asking the Supreme Court to vacate the stay pending the appeal.

The Court held that it was proper to vacate the stay because it is not justified under the governing test. First, the Court held that parents who seek religious exemptions are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim because they usually trigger a strict scrutiny analysis, which requires a court to evaluate whether the school policy substantially interfered with the parents’ right to guide their children’s religious development. Because gender dysphoria has important implications for a child’s mental health and because parents feel strongly about their religious obligations to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs concerning sex and gender, the Court reasoned that California’s policies will not likely survive the strict scrutiny analysis that Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522 (2025), demands. Further, the Court held that irreparable harm would result from denying the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights during the appellate process and that the balance of equities necessitates a decision which prioritizes the children’s safety and parents’ role in ensuring that safety.

Justice Barrett, the Chief Justice, and Justice Kavanaugh authored a concurrence to express that ensuring substantive due process asks the Court to find unexpressed rights in a constitutional provision—rights which must be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 (1997). Here, the three justices maintain, the doctrine of substantive due process has traditionally supported a parent’s right to raise his or her child, which includes participating in significant decisions about their mental health. Justice Kagan and Justice Jackson dissented, reasoning that, for such a novel and important legal question, the Court’s review on the emergency docket was limited, swift, and premature, considering the appellate process has barely started. Additionally, those justices argued that the Due Process Clause does not expressly grant parental rights of any kind.

Combined with the Court’s deliberations in the transgender athletes cases of Little v. Hecox (No. 24-38) and West Virginia v. B.P.J. (No. 24-43), discussed in Dykema’s February edition, this case is likely to be one of several having lasting implications for equal protection litigation and education law.

For more information, please contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, or Monika Harris.